U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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[redacted]

DATE: JUN 19 2012 OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER FILE: [redacted]

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary: [redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The employment-based immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The decision is withdrawn and the matter remanded to the director for a new decision.

The petitioner is a software consulting business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a software engineer pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). The petition is accompanied by ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, certified by the United States Department of Labor (the DOL).

The director determined that the ETA Form 9089 failed to demonstrate that the job requires a professional holding an advanced degree and, therefore, the beneficiary cannot be found qualified for classification as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4). Specifically, the ETA Form 9089 requires a master's degree in computer science, electronics, or electronics engineering and three years of experience in the job offered (or in a variety of alternative occupations listed in Part H, Questions 10-B and 14) or, alternatively, a bachelor's degree and five years of work experience. However, because the petitioner noted in Question 14 that it "[w]ill also accept any equally suitable combination of education, training and/or experience which would qualify an applicant to perform the duties of the job offered," the director denied the petition. The director concluded that this response to Question 14 lowered the minimum job requirements to below a bachelor's degree plus five years of progressive experience and, thus, disqualified the position for classification as an advanced degree professional.

On appeal, counsel describes the petitioner's response to Question 14 as "*Kellogg* language" which does not disqualify the position for the requested classification.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and timely. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced degree is a United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulation further states: "A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree." *Id.*

Here, the Form I-140 was filed on July 13, 2010. On Part 2.d. of the Form I-140, the petitioner indicated that it was filing the petition for a member of the professions holding an advanced degree or an alien of exceptional ability.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4) states in pertinent part that "[t]he job offer portion of an individual labor certification, Schedule A application, or Pilot Program application must demonstrate that the job requires a professional holding an advanced degree or the equivalent of an alien of exceptional ability."

In this case, the job offer portion of the ETA Form 9089, specifically the response to Question 14, is not inconsistent with the minimum requirements for classification as a professional holding an advanced degree. Accordingly, the director's decision is withdrawn.

The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(h)(4)(ii) states:

> If the alien beneficiary already is employed by the employer, and the alien does not meet the primary job requirements and only potentially qualifies for the job by virtue of the employer's alternative requirements, certification will be denied unless the application states that any suitable combination of education, training, or experience is acceptable.

This regulation was intended to incorporate the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA) ruling in *Francis Kellogg*, 1994-INA-465 and 544, 1995-INA 68 (Feb. 2, 1998) (en banc), that "where the alien does not meet the primary job requirements, but only potentially qualifies for the job because the employer has chosen to list alternative job requirements, the employer's alternative requirements are unlawfully tailored to the alien's qualifications . . . unless the employer has indicated that applicants with any suitable combination of education, training or experience are acceptable." The statement that an employer will accept applicants with "any suitable combination of education, training or experience" is commonly referred to as "*Kellogg* language."

Previously, the DOL was denying labor certification applications containing alternative requirements if Part H, Question 14, of the application did not contain the *Kellogg* language. However, two BALCA decisions have significantly weakened this requirement. In *Federal Insurance Co.*, 2008-PER-00037 (Feb. 20, 2009), BALCA held that the ETA Form 9089 failed to provide a reasonable means for an employer to include the *Kellogg* language on the labor certification. Therefore, BALCA concluded that the denial of the labor certification for failure to write the *Kellogg* language on the labor certification application violated due process. Also, in *Matter of Agma Systems LLC*, 2009-PER-00132 (BALCA Aug. 6, 2009), BALCA held that the requirement to include *Kellogg* language did not apply when the alternative requirements were "substantially equivalent" to the primary requirements.

Given the history of the *Kellogg* language requirement at 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(h)(4)(ii), the AAO does not interpret this phrase to mean that the employer would accept lesser qualifications than the stated primary and alternative requirements on the labor certification. To do so would make the actual

minimum requirements of the offered position impossible to discern, it would render largely meaningless the stated primary and alternative requirements of the offered position on the labor certification, and it would potentially make any labor certification with alternative requirements ineligible for classification as an advanced degree professional. The director's decision is withdrawn.

However, the petition may not be approved at this time because the record does not establish that the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) first examines whether the petitioner has paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year from the priority date. If the petitioner has not paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year, USCIS will next examine whether the petitioner had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the difference between the wage paid, if any, and the proffered wage.[1] If the petitioner's net income or net current assets is not sufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may also consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities. *See Matter of Sonegawa,* 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm'r 1967).

Furthermore, according to USCIS records, the petitioner has filed 156 I-140 petitions on behalf of other beneficiaries. The petitioner claims to employ only 119 workers. This calls into question the bona fides of the job offer and whether the job offer at the proffered wage was realistic. The petitioner must establish that it has had the continuing ability to pay the combined proffered wages to each beneficiary from the priority date of the instant petition. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977). The evidence in the record does not document the priority date, proffered wage or wages paid to each beneficiary, whether any of the other petitions have been withdrawn, approved, revoked, or denied, or whether any of the other beneficiaries have obtained lawful permanent residence. Thus, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary and the proffered wages to the beneficiaries of its other petitions.

In view of the foregoing, the previous decision of the director will be withdrawn. The petition is remanded to the director for consideration of the issue stated above. The director may request any additional evidence considered pertinent. Similarly, the petitioner may provide additional evidence within a reasonable period of time to be determined by the director. Upon receipt of all the evidence, the director will review the entire record and enter a new decision.

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[1] *See River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983); and *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011).

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The director's decision is withdrawn; however, the petition is currently unapprovable for the reasons discussed above, and therefore the AAO may not approve the petition at this time. Because the petition is not approvable, the petition is remanded to the director for issuance of a new, detailed decision.